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ABSTRACT 
Prosperity and Stability in Hong-Kong--A Cultural Approach* 
The framework of analysis begins with the construction of the "static 
morphological structure" of a political economic system emphasizing a 
hierarchized class structure. The dynamics of the "rational interclass 
mobility," that involves human activities in the economic as well as the 
political domains can then be explored in an integrated fashion. It will then 
be shown that the traditional cultural values that provided the basic 
motivating force for the operation of the integrated system in the traditional 
agrarian society (i.e. of traditional China) is still operative in the modern 
technological society--using the case of Hong Kong as a concrete illustration. 
*This is the second part, i.e. a continuation of the first part, of a paper
entitled "Economic Development and Traditional Cultural Values," written in 
1985. The overall conclusion of these papers is that when what is fundamental 
is known, an ancient culture of an agrarian society can survive in the modern 
technological society with only slight modifications. Moreover, since the 
"fundamental" cultural tradition is on secularisms and "rational" 
egalitarianisms, economic prosperity and social political stability are 
ensured. 
Prosperity and Stability in Hong Kong-a Cultural Approach 
by John C.H, Fei 
January, 1987 
Introduction 
In the modernization processes of the less developed regions of the 
· world, the post War "economic miracle on the rock"
1 in Hong Kong ( to be 
abbreviated as H.K.) is matched by her social political stability that is so 
rare in the contemporary scene. Her economic prosperity and social 
political stability are so well known and yet so complex that what we 
have here is a puzzle.2 To solve this puzzle one would almost have to take 
a cultural approach, that has the power to cut through the artificial 
"disciplinary" boundaries of economics, political science and sociology, as 
will be attempted in this paper. 
Since the overwhelming majority in H.K. is Chinese, it is inevitable to 
bring "traditional China" into the picture in a cultural approach. When 
economic prosperity and political stability are carefully defined and when 
what I regard as her "fundamental cul~ural values" are correctly 
identified, the central thesis of this paper becomes a "cultural 
deterministic" one, namely, the former (i.e. prosperity and stability) will 
be shown to be merely a product of the latter (i.e. cultural values). 
1 
. Framework of Analysis 
Our framework of analysis will begin by a "picturing" of the "static 
morphological structure" of a political-economic system emphasizing a 
hierarchized class structure (section 1). The dynamics of rotational 
interclass mobility that involves human activities in the economic as well 
as political domains will be explored (section 2). The traditional cultural 
values that support these rotations will be identified and analyzed in the 
economic and political domains (section 3). Finally, the linkage of H.K. and 
traditional China, cultural or value-wise, will be explored, in an 
evolutionary perspective, in the concluding section (4). 
Our paper will hopefully reveal what may be called the "fundamental 
cultural values" that provide a hereditary linkage between the 
technological society of- Hong Kong and the agrarian society of traditional 
China. To me, the case of H.K. is interesting primarily because of the fact 
that it is a small window showing that when what is "fundamental" is 
known, an ancient culture of an agrarian society can survive in a modern 
technological society with only slight modifications. Moreover, since the 
"fundamental" cultural trait is on secularism and rational egalitarianism, 
economic prosperity and. social political stability are ensured. 
2 
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1. Static Morphological Structure 
.The polity of traditional China is indicated in diagram 1b to show its 
morphological "isomorphism" (or simiiarity in forms) with that of Hong 
Kong. While the similarity may be somewhat superficial, it is, 
nevertheless, crucial if certain key aspects of the polity of Hong Kong, 
with her overwhelming (over 95%) Chinese population, is viewed as an 
evolutionary descendant of the traditional one. The static morphological 
structure reveals certain properties--i.e. hierarchy(1.1 ), separation of 
Monarch from bureaucracy(1.2), and elite and non-elite contact(1.3)--that 
will be explored next.. 
1.1) Hierarchy and pyramid 
When polity is defined in terms of the relatedness between 
gover_nment (at the top) and the society (at the bottom), there is, first of 
all, a notion of hierarchy where an elite class (if~) is sandwiched in the 
middle ( see diagram 1). The existence of a static hierarchy and the elite 
class ( a decided minority) is due partly to certain human "proclivity" 
(e.g. aggression, desire for distinction and power, and affluence), and 
hence the "benefit" (~3Jk.) such as social status ~i.~~), material 
affluence~;{ JJ )and accessibility to political power(¥~) must always be 
allocated unequally to favor a relatively small minority. This is true in any 
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human society, or even in animal species for which a social hierarchy can 
· be defined in the "Dominance System" of sociobiology(see chapter 13 of 
Sociobiology, footnote 44). 
Thus, a hierarchy always carries a statistical notion of a pyramid such 
that the elite class in the middle, while having more of these "benefits" 
than the vast majority of non-elite at the bottom (e:g. farmers, workers, 
and small merchants,· accounting for perhaps over 90
6/o of the total 
population), has less of the same than a small core of elite absorbed 
formally into the government sector. 
In diagram 1 a,b, a non-elite in the society is represented by a dot"." 
while an elite, by a circle "o" appearing at the society level at the bottom 
and the "elite level" in the middle. There is an even smaller core (i.e. a 
$Ub-class) of elite, described as absorbed elite who, after being absorbed 
formally into the government sector, enjoy more "benefits" than other 
elites and non-elites. 
A basic trait of traditonal Chinese culture is the recognition of the 
inevitability (if not desirability) of a hierarchical polity as natural. In the 
Confucian tradition, the very notion of rules of propriety {:f u) prescribes 
the status distinction not only between the emperor(lz) and subordinates 
(ltt¾), but also that of the high class (-:t KA__ ) and common people 
<:Jf,N- Different classes are clearly delineated and differentiated by 
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codes of dressing~) and rituals¢f0J_(}. In addition to this, "laws" 
are dichotomized into "proper rules of conduct"(~) and "corporeal 
punishment"{:if-11) to be applied discriminatorily to the two classes 
separately (~j+~~t-._. ;~ ~ 1 jt ~ ) . 
The political cultural trait (so strange to the Western ears accustomed 
to "democracy" and "equality before the law") was well preserved in the 
19th century so that contemporary political scientists invariably describe 
the traditional Chinese polity with an introductory emphasis on her 
"hierarchy"3. In fact, the acceptance of hierarchy in social classes can be 
traced back.to the naturalist philosopher such as Chuang Tze in ancient 
China (~~i7--Jf'~ ~tf.1~)- Likewise, the society of Hong Kong also has 
her hierarchy wlth elite class. A small core of which is also formally 
abosrbed into the Executive Council and/or Legislative Council.4 
1.2) Separation of Monarch from Bureaucracy 
A closer scrutiny of diagram 1 a.b shows that, in the government 
sector, there is a separation of the Monarch ( the Queen in Hong Kong and 
the Emperor in traditional China) from the "inverted tree like" 
bureaucratic network with all its functional departments (executive, 
judicial and legislative).5 When the bureaucracy operates, there is an 
upward transmission of information to and a downward transmission of 
orders from the chief executive (e.g. the Governor of Hong Kong and the 
5 
Premier in traditional China) through its own hierarchy of authority, when 
' 
divison of labor is at work. 
In the case of the government of traditional China, the separation of 
Monarch from the bureaucracy was a prominent feature firmly established 
in Han Dynasty ( 200 B.C.).6 Although the separated system suffered 
certain setbacks during the Ming Dynasty (when the premiership was 
abolished),7 it is nevertheless a basic feature of the Chinese government 
organization. As to Hong Kong, the separation is quite complete in that 
the Governor is only responsible to the Queen very indirectly through the 
Colonial Office in London. 
This very separation is a factor that contributes to political stability. 
For when divorced from the frailty of bureaucrats, the Monarch acquires an 
independent spiritual existence that becomes mighty and "holy"
8. In 
traditional China only "rebels" would dare to challenge the "son of heaven" 
(~~) and "His Government". As to the Chinese in Hong Kong, the Queen 
symbolizes the might of Her Empire and Her Governor, that is not to be 
challenged with impunity. 
1.3) Contacts of Elite and Non-elite in the Society 
If a hierarchy of social classes (i.e. of elites and non-elites) is 
accepted as natural, we can reject from the outset the leftist view of 
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"class antagonisms" and "class struggle" as irrelevant to the social 
. political reality of China. For the political process what is important of 
the coexistence of elites (i.e. the successful businessmen in Hong Kong 
and the landed gentry class (--J; )(J(~~~~ in traditional China) and 
non-elites ( small businessmen, workers and/or farmers) is their 
"locational" pattern rendering it possible for frequent personal contacts 
between the higher and lower classes on a broad front. 
The possibility of this contact is represented symbolically by the 
spacially spreading pattern of "location" of the members of elite class at· 
the society level of diagram 1 a.b that is mixed with non-elite. As a 
consequence, the elites are familiar with (i.e. constantly informed of) the 
problems of the lower classes, and can be contributory to the alleviation 
of some of them when they are absorbed into the government in the 
political process (see 2.2c). When viewed in this political-operational 
perspective, the attitude of higher to the lower class, must obviously be 
one characterized by "problem sensitivity" to be reciprocated by a sense of 
"respect" in the other direction. Otherwise, the lower class can not be 
represented in the political process. 
While democracy is a sensitive issue at the present time, we shall 
argue that participation in the political process by "representation" is not 
all that important as compared with an implicit inter-class "respect". 
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While "representation" is a theoretical possibility, it is of minimal 
significance in the case of both H.K. and traditional China, due not only to a 
negative reason of "political apathy", but, more importantly, to a positive 
value attached to "laissez faire" (see 2.3b). 
2. Polity Dynamics 
Political stability is a time-specific dynamic concept. In diagram 
1 a,b, the time dimension is represented by the horizontal time axis (t), 
indicated at the top to remind us that our focus is now on dynamic issues 
of polity. Two such issues-- "transfer of ruling power of the Monarch" and 
"social mobility" that are genealogical sensitive will be analyzed in this 
section. While the former is characterized by a "lineality", the latter is 
basically "rotational". That the "lineal transfer of ruling power" is a 
contributing factor to social political stability will be analyzed first 
(2.1). However, our e~phasis is on the economic implications of the 
distributional justice implied in a rotational social mobility process (2.2). 
The "rotational justice" finds expression in the domains of economic and 
political activities that compliment each other. When "Laissez Faire" is 
attached with high value, the political mobility in the rotational process 
takes on a significance that is primarily "distributional" and becomes 
independent of the "representation" aspect of the polity (2.3). 
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2.1} Trnasfer of Monarchy Ruling Power and Revolution 
In both Hong Kong and traditional China, the orderly transfer of the 
Monarchy ruling power (genealogically to preserve the continuity of "royal 
blood"} is symbolic of the stability of the government through time. There 
were occasionally abrupt deviations and obstructions of the established 
rules of throne inheritance, that tantamount to revolutions (or rebellions 
in the case of China}. In this regard the polity is quite stable-though in 
different senses- for Hong Kong and traditional China. 
In almost 300 years of constitution democracy since the last 
"Bloodless" and "Glorious" Revolution (1688A.D.}, the "crown inheritance" 
in England has been so stable for so long that few (including the vast 
majority of Chinese in Hong Kong) envision the slightest chance of a 
"revolution" in ·London. That this has been a contributing factor to the 
political stability of Hong Kong in the past can be readily appreciated from 
the fact that there has been a near unanimity of expectation and faith that 
a pragmatic and workabre termination of the colonial rule in Hong Kong by 
1997 is to be achieved by a peaceful process of negotiation, 
uncontaminated by termoils and /or revolution, through the good officers 
of Her Majesty. 
In the case of traditional China, there has been repeated "rebellions" 
through dynastic cycles. However, the polity, at the same time, has been 
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extremely stable in that the same polity was restored with little 
modification after the rebellious turmoils were over.9 For traditional 
China, the cycles of rebellions and rehabilitations of the same polity are 
shown at the top of diagram 1 b to remind us that the polity of China is 
most rebellious yet most stable as "to rebel is justified".1O Although we 
shall use the expression of "political stability", the readers should 
remember that this implies the absence of revolution in England and the 
plentifulness of rebellions with resilience in China. 
The rotation of "peace (;;~) with unity(~)" and "turmoil ?L) and 
· division ( to'-}" has been so frequent in the long history of China, that the 
expectation of such cycles becomes a part of popular Chinese political 
culture ( )(1~1'.;_,/::,1-i)', 1-v'- 7--.._1,j; ~ ). After nearly 150 years of 
turmoils and divisions since the Opium War, the vast majority of Chinese 
now expect the imminent arrival of "peace with unity" phase. "Nobody 
wants to disturb the hard-earned peace" is the tune of the time in H.K. 
while a keenly felt necessity to unite is echoed, if not for China as.a 
whole immediately, at least for Taiwan and the Mainland internally and 
separately. 
The political stability of Hong Kong must be understood not only in 
terms of a decolonization process but also, perhaps more importantly, in 
terms of the background of our time, i.e. the intrinsic demand for political 
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unity which is so peculiarly a part of the political culture of China. 
According to Prof. Chien Mu, "from the political point of view, the 
unification of China under Chin and Han is itself a miracle.1111 This is 
indeed so when we take into consideration of her population size, the 
expansion of her land space, the nonhomogeneity of geographic background 
and her linguistic diversity. 
2.2) Social Mobility 
a) The Two-tiered Rotational Social Mobilit~ 
The statistical notion of a pyramid of a triplet of social classes {see 
1.1) immediately implies that, to sustain the static pyramid through time, 
there inust be both upward (i.e. promotional) and downward (i.e.demotional) 
inter-class social mobility for the genealogical descendants of members 
of the three classes- the bureaucrats, elites, and non-elites. The 
simultaneity of "promotion" and "demotion" may be referred to as inter­
class rotation. SpecifiGally, inter-class rotations must be carried out at 
two levels: the rotation of membership between elites and non-elites at 
the lower societal level, and the rotation of absorbed and non-absorbed 
elites at the upper level. At both levels. there is a selection process for 
which the upper mobility may be referred to, abstractly, as "nomination" 
and "screening" respectively for the two levels that, collectively, 
constitute a social ladder that can be climbed {see diagram 1a.b). 
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b) Distributional Justice and Social Mobilities 
More tharf2500 years ago, Conofucius has fully anticipated the theme 
of this paper in his often-quoted statement "distribution injustice is to be 
lamented more than economic scarcity" (1z_j~,i4t~ ). There will 
always be unequal distribution of "benefits" (affluence, status and power) 
in any society ( H.K., China, U.S. or Soviet Union); a fact that Confucius was 
only too realistic to ignore. The "serving" of the cause of distribution 
justice is reducible, in our formulation, to the~ regulating the 
"nomination" and "screening" in the rotational social mobility process. 
In a modern technological society, taking into consideration of the 
time and energies spent by an average adult on economic matters, the 
"legal justice", that only punishes the law-violating "aggressors" in the 
court, must be accompanied by the far more important "economic justice" 
that ayvards the meritorious performers, as well, in the market place. The 
component parts of the "total justice" that Confucius had in mind must be 
viewed in a "complimentary" fashion holistically. 
c) The Complimentarity of Nomination and Screening 
In H.K., for the vast majority of the non-elite (workers, fishermen, 
small businessmen, and/or their sons) the only avenue of "promotion" to 
the rank of the elite is to compete successfully in the market place in a 
"screening" process. This is complimented by the "nomination" process 
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· when a smalltore of the most successful elite is promoted to the 
..·. •~xecutive" and especialy the "legislative" councit.12 The complimentary 
\nature ofthe:iwo types of promotion is clear from the very fact that it is 
the most successful businessmen that stand any chance of being 
"absorbed". This is evident when the succint summary of the 
"administrative absorption politics" of Prof. King is read carefully: 
"An alternative explanation of political stability in Hong Kong 
focuses on the support to the colonial government rendered by the 
Chinese elites, particularly prominant among which are those in 
the commercial and industrial sectors. As hong Kong is not an 
independent or democratic state, representative institutions 
wherein elites with differentiated interests and resource bases 
vie for political power and influence are largely absent. 
Nevertheless, elite-group participation in policy making in the 
colony is effected through the so-called process of "administrative 
absorption of politics."13 
There is, however, a strong suspicion that the "synarchy", in the 
undemocratic state, is merely a window-dressing formality as the 
absorbed elites are not representative of the interest of the mass after 
alt.14 It is true that "the co-option of potentially dis-affected leaders 
into the government machinery deprives the protest movements of 
leadership and makes the mobilization of the mass for political 
movements extremely difficult.1115· However, the "leaders" are more likely 
viewed, culturally, as trouble makers and are ignored by the mass. The 
"nomination" process at the top tells less than a full story of social 
mobility when it is divorced from the complimentary "screening" process 
at the bottom. With such a divorce, the economic prosperity of H.K. is left 
unexplained, while her political stability was explained half-heartedly.1
6 
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The social ladder represents "rotational social justice" in a 
well-ordered hierarchy with "integrity". The durable Monarch at the very 
· top is there to award honorary titles (~{:t.~-:t.#_;{j, in both H.K. and 
traditional China, that constitutes political recognition of merits. For 
gregarious animal species, the selection of the fittest "political" 
leadership for survival ( e.g. a "strong" monkey king and "experienced" food 
hunter) is based on "instincts" that, too, recognizes the merit of strength 
and /or experience. As in the case of traditonal China, the selection 
process is reinforced by cultural values that award the entitlement to 
political authority, and is based almost exclusively on the criteria of 
demonstrated capacity of "capability and virtues"Q!_f~ 0L ). In ancient 
China, this principle was best illustrated by the competitive examination • 
system (;!M...t,,l~) which started from Tang Dynasty. It is from this 
viewpoint that we shall look closely at the domains of political and 
economic activities. 
2.3) Political Economic System 
a) Domain of Economic and Social Political Activities 
Social mobility rotations rest on the foundation of a market system 
in which individuals interact directly (via exchanges) as coordinated by 
the automatic adjustment mechanism of market signals (i.e. information 
on wage, price, interest rate) to achieve the efficiency of division of 
labor, essential for economic prosperity. A quality attribute of the market 
system is free and fair competition for which Hong Kong has a first rate 
reputation in the modern world. That traditional agricultural China also 
has a great reputation to match in the ancient world is apparent when the 
definition of "economic prosperity" for agricultural societies is examined 
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carefully ( see 4.2). 
To mark off human activities in the market system, individuals in the 
societies of diagram i a,b, are linked by line segments ( shown in diagram 
1 c) to show a network of direct interactions in the economic domain via 
the use of money as the medium of exchange. This "private" domain of 
individualism may be thought of as a "horizontal" component to emphasize 
a contrast with the "vertical" network of human relations (i.e. that of 
social political inter-class mobility of diagram 1 a,b), that takes on a 
tinge of "public collectivism" in the social political domain. Economic 
prosperity and social political stability are essentially dynamic qualities 
of the two domains respectively. 
b) Laissez Faire 
To the political scientist the "collectivism" of polity is comparable to 
a "factory" where political "inputs" flow from the society to the 
government and "outputs" flow in the opposite direction (see diagram 
1a,b). The "inputs" are "interests" of the various social classes that the 
bureaucrats must make an effort to find out ·(i.e. "solicitation") as they are 
expressed ("articulation"), clarified when unclear ("communication"), 
compromise when in conflict ("aggregation") to determine the package of 
outputs flows (legislative, judicial and executive).17 
Since, according to David Hume 18, the stability of assets possession 
(i.e. private property including the means of production) is so important 
for the smooth functioning of the market system, the political "factory" 
will have to produce laws and order (i.e. including national defense, 
protection of private property right, settlement of contractual disputes) 
plus a minimum package of public services (roads, transportation, flood 
controls in traditional China, public health, water reservoir and housing in 
Hong Kong) that can only be produced efficiently by the government 
publicly. 
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The well-known Laissez Faire (or positive non-intervention) in Hong 
Kong essentially means that the "factory outputs" do not go very much, 
beyond the minimum package that interferes with and obstructs the 
operation of the "horizontal" component. It implies, in particular, that the 
"factory output" will not aim at "income transfers" between social classes 
(e.g. in welfare programs) that violate the. cardinal principle of income. 
distribution justice based on the equalization of opportunity. 
Laissez Faire is not only a British culture since Adam Smith, but also 
has a long Chinese tradition ~~~Ai .y;ri~~. J, ~ di] ;t )in 
Taoism and Confucianism that also saw the importance of the stability of 
assets possession {itl tt-!} ~tt~l-:s' ). 19 As tuned up by their traditional 
cultural values, the Chinese feel they have no right to make demands on 
the part of the government { a political culture, see 3.3a below) as they 
know that they should take care of themselves {see 3.1 below) in the 
economic domain. 
c) The "ln!:hmendence" of Political Nomination from "Repr~~entative
11 Politv 
Prof. King_ refers to the polity (i.e. the vertical components) of Hong 
Kong as having an existence independent of economics {i.e. that the former 
is not ~m "epiphenomenon" of the latter.20) If "Laissez Faire" is a value 
consensus, whatever "outputs" produced by the political "factory" beyond 
the minimum package b~comes irrelevant to the story of social political 
stability. But then the "inputs" {i.e. all the interest articulation, 
solicitation, communication and aggregation) into the "factory" become 
trivial too as they are merely window dressing formality because everyone 
agrees on the desirability of minimization of "factory outputs" with or 
without the formalism of consultation. 
The "joint rule" {i.e. the synarchy) of the "absorbed elite" and the 
"positively non-intervening" Governor {which can now be equated with the 
Monarch), perpetuated through time by the rotational class mobility, 
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serves a purpose other than what is to be "produced" by the government 
technically. The formalism of the hierarchical class structure, with all 
the implied unequal distribution of the "benefits" (affluence, status, and 
power), is, nevertheless, important for a good rational reason condusive to 
both economic prosperity and political stability, in both traditional China 
and Hong Kong. The political nomination {or "recruitment") is but a small 
part of the rotational process that must be explored from the viewpoint of 
the political-economic incentive effect of a principle of income 
distribution justice based on "egalitarianism". 
3. A Cultural Deterministic Thesis of Prosperity and Stability 
To develop a cultural-deterministic thesis of economic prosperity and 
political stability, we shall identify the "fundamental" cultural values 
(3.1). Since it does not recognize "disciplinary" boundaries, we shall 
explore its operational significances in the economic domain (3.2), the 
political domain (3.3), where the "mainline" thinking on the "political 
culture" will be examined. A synthesis will be attempted (3.4). 
3.1) The Fundamental Cultural Values 
a) Fundamental Cultural Values 
Certain traditional cultural values can and did stand the test of time 
so well that we may refer to them as "fundamental". The subtitles of the 
short volume, "A Look Into the Contemporary Significance of Chinese 
Culture from the View Point of Value System" (f{,<j1i}t?Ut1~~~~1l!-<~ 
!,~ by Prof. Yu,21 provide certain "lines" that deserve to be paraphrased 
with slight distortions. 
First of all, "from the time of Confucius, human integrity was firmly 
established" ( t(~~~i~~G-:)w<.,t,<lt,~tt-~i) ,p.51) so that the 
"cultivation of the internal strength is the heart of Chinese moral" (i71~J;.~~. 
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1~ft-11tt}7t~~~-{2-, p. ~02). The proper rules of conducts 
governing the "five pairs" ( :L<1d', i.e. "father-son", "husband-wife", 
·"older-youngster", "one-his friends", and, to a lesser extent, 
"emperor-subordinate") are but manifestations of that "individual 
strength" as social obligations toward "other parties" that one encounters 
unavoidably ('3i1~{w<.111lt<-A '1'ts&J~l,~~"-~!, ~ittl-<r. p. 73). Thus, to 
the Chinese, human "right" is an alien concept subordinative to a sense of 
"contractual social obligation" (t1~.i<-_i)~ ~¾tli~" ~ ffl)J.~(f,Ati 
,.tt--t.1 ,p.95) that is readily extendable (e.g. to teacher-student, 
employer-employee, buyer-seller, renter-rentee, doctor-patients,etc.) at 
modern time that incidentally renders the high-density living of H.K. 
tolerable and peacefui.22 
Although the general proper rules of conduct CtG) has, as a 
by-product, social "orderliness", it is again the individualistic strength 
that is basic ( ~ll J ~kl"f ~}!t~~ ~, {!.:$_ ~l*J i~{tf] "- ,p.86). Thus, 
in a modern rendition, "crime prevention" takes precedence over 
"punishment" as clearly stated by the sage ($.g~~%i~./4..~,/y'5"~~~if ). 
The values of a belief in "one self1123, that is to be persistently cultivated 
by learning and practices(~~~~~ ) gentlemanly endeavorous to the 
extreme ~,ite1'i.tJ.f_\~~) with optimism (~w<.~l_) is exemplified by 
the _cosmos (iJ that is busily renewing itself all the time( ~ €} l't, f.:I ~ Jt. 
5l t1 Jt )as ordained by heaven ( ~li'{{, '7, <l 1>A ~ ~ J 1 ). 
b) Bational Egalitarianism and Secularism 
While the Western culture had to go through a long process of 
secularization,24 China has always had a secular (i.e. economic) culture 
long before the time of Confucius. Indeed, the Chinese wanted to remember 
their legendary political leaders (e.g.?, t} f )by associations with 
specific pragmatic inventions (such asl f for campass,~#!l for 
silk, ~J..... for fire, ;fi 1, for house, ~11 for agriculture and medicine, 
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v(~ for animal husbandry,'/(_~ for flood control,~J,:&_ for vehicle, 
l1 i{.ft for boats(?), and¼:t,A for written letters) that benefited 
economic life. After Buddhism was imported into China, the Chinese, 
instead of being celestialized, has in fact secularized Buddhism.25 
Elsewhere in this volume,26 I have referred to the fundamental 
Chinese cultural values as rational egalitarianism(R.E.), interpreted as 
believing in equalization of opportunity by relying on one self, and 
secularism(S), interpreted as the devotion of their creative energies to 
the economic domain to survive and to be prosperous. As an abbreviation, 
these values would be denoted as RES. Prof. Yu is optimistic in believing 
that, with slight modification, the RES can survive the tests of time(~~t~j 
~~-,t~t-~~v~ ~ f e1 iJ~_)f\ ~'\\ t ~A__ ,p. 112), a 
· prediction that I fully concur with. 
c) lmplication__Qn Rotational Justice 
The fundamental cultural value (RES) immediately implies, as a 
consequence, a fairness of distribution justice when everyone finds a 
deserving right place in the ceaseless rotational class mobility. The 
system provides motivating force for endeavours because the enticing 
"benefits" (affluence, status and power) of the hierarchized class 
structure is unequal. Confucian scholars councilled complacency with one's 
right place c.&ti.~~o.]f,<>,lf~p) with a psychological preparedness 
for failure ( a calm unperturbedness followed by tranquil reposeij~ft ~ 
but only after one makes the utmost effort in self endeavour <J."'--~ 4 
~~ ). This is obviously the cultural origin of economic prosperity and 
"political apathy"- a contributing factor to social political stability - in 
H.K.,27 and traditional China. 
When the modern political scientists uncovered a strange political 
cultural trait of traditional China, to the effect that the Imperial 
Government always took it upon herself to give "lectures" to the society on 
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"moral rules'\ they should perhaps pay a closer attention to the content of 
the fundamental values (see 3.3 below). 
3.2) Ibe Chinese Economic Culture 
The Chinese were tuned up with a social personality described by Prof. 
Yu as·: 
" There are something good and bad about traditional cultural values. 
The good part is that the Chinese love freedom. The bad part is 
their "looseness" ~Ji), like a "plate of loose sand" (-i {(<f ). 
"Freedom" and "looseness" can almost summarize the entire social 
personality of the Chinese inclusive of all social groups at the 
higher (scholars, gentry) and lower (farmers) levels
1128 
Most economists would consider Prof. Yu, a very first rate scholar in 
philosophical thought; a poor economist. For the loose-sand-like 
independence of "self interest", when disciplined by the invisible hand of 
the market force, has always been equated with material well-being and 
moral strength, since the beginning of the modern growth epoch 200 years 
ago, by Adam Smith. Any form of collusion in the economic domain 
(monopoly or gentlemen agreement) is a cultural weakness, a cowardly 
fear for competition. 
That the individualistically oriented fundamental culture value (RES) 
is still pretty much alive in modern H.K. is supportable by scholarly 
researchers of sociology. In his thesis on social political stability in H.K., 
the "utilitarian familism" of Prof. Lau is defined as the following: 
"Briefly, utilitarianistic familism can be defined as a normative 
and behavioural tendency of an individual to place his familial in 
interest above the interest of the society on any of its 
component individuals and groups, and to structure his relation­
ship with other individuals and groups in such a fashion that the 
furtherance of his familial interests is the primary 
consideration. Moreover, among the familial interests 
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materialistic interests take priority over all other interests.
1129 
Thus, a typical "head of the household" of the family is not a part of 
"politics" (i.e. "alienated from the social and political order
1130) and, 
frankly, doesn't want to be bothered with it ( "most of them are unaware 
of any possible forms of interest articulation or interest aggregation, not 
to say interest representation at the governmental level.
1131 ), considering 
it a waste of time and energy. It is hard to ask him to even "think of the 
injustice of colonialism.1132 He would rather have nothing to do with his 
fellow citizens (i.e. "adopt an attitude of avoidance toward other social 
groups1133) unless his own pocket is at stake (i.e. "a certain amount of 
interaction with other social groups is allowable if utilitarian interests 
are involved.1134) All he really cares is the maintenance of laws and order, 
by an authority he realy trusts, so that he can have a peace of mind to go 
at full speed in chasing after money with a sense of urgency and 
immediacy. 
Thus, when stripped of the jargon, the "utilitarian familism" is a 
perfect definition of an apolitical economic man, the money chasing profit 
maximizer in the economic domain glorified by the economists. This is no 
doubt a product of the fundamental cultural values of traditional China. 
3.3) Chinese political Culture 
a) The Moralizing Polity 
All human societies have value-preserving institutions to imprint (i.e. 
to internalize) the "fundamental cultural values" in the minds of the young 
and the old in every new generation via the use of language, spoken and/or 
written. In this way, the cultural values survive to form a tradition ~~ 
that is well known for its continuity and longevity ~j~) in the case 
of China. However, the value-preserving institutions, typified by schools, 
organized religion, and , most important of all, families, should be 
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differentiated from the fundamental values themselves much as an ice box 
should be differentiated from the ice cream that it preserves. 
A peculiar trait of traditional China with regard to the value-
preserving institutions was that the government,( \1})1J.t~ _l : internally 
the saintly way externally the kingly way), played a paramount but 
secondary role subordinating to that of teachers (if~iG t */.z~ ). 
That traditional China had a moralizing polity was very much "played up" 
by some modern political scientists in their attempt to analyzing political 
instability of contemporary China.35 It is well-known that on account of 
her moralizing polity, China has no need for organized church such as the 
Catholic Church of the West. Chinese traditional religion comprises the 
loosely organized and localistic "cult of worshiping deities and ancestors, 
· and the ereqtion of temples,1136 which is still very prominent in Hong Kong. 
With regard to moral matters, the .government has no choice but to be 
despotic and paternalistic (much as the Catholic churches), which leads to 
both positive and negative consequences. Positively, the government must 
look after the "interests"(i.e. the moral fibers) of the people (°AJA 1 ), 
· and in the absorption process the nominees must be those who are capable 
and, more importantly, virtuous ~J~~z)- Negatively, the political son ( a-­
~) has no "right" to make any demand to the political "father" U(~ i ) 
and, even less so, to the son of heaven K:r) who is as "infallible" as the 
Pope on spiritual affairs. 
The above is, in essence, the mainline interpretation of the political 
culture of traditional China (i.e. a stern lecturing "father" that employed 
1'good teachers" to teach the "voiceless sons" to be good
37). Just as the 
economists are snobbishly insisting in the "economic man" as essential, 
the political scientists overplay their hands when they insist that the only 
essential "content" of the "lectures" is "Thou shall not be aggressive", and 
that, supposedly, by such "verbalization" on moral values, the culture 
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itself has been preserved to be stable for more than 2000 years. 
b) A Thesis of "authority crisis" 
Once the moralizing polity disintegrates, authority crises appear. 
Such a thesis of social-political instability reads: 
"Having suggested a link between the repression of aggression 
and the tendency to verbalize moralistically about politics, we are 
in a position to.. .introduce the central thesis of this study. We 
argue that the Confucian tradition, both structurally and 
ideologically, created forms of authority that gained strength by 
denying the legitimacy of sentiments of aggression. Therefore, 
once this system of authority was dirupted, the problem of 
controlling aggression complicated the process of establishing 
new forms of authority ... .ln a psychological sense one can indeed 
think of the prime function of government as this basic social need 
to control aggression; and therefore it is understandable that 
civic-oriented socialization processes would tend to focus on the 
control of aggression.1138 
When the traditional society evolves to become a technological one, 
the e_conomy becomes so complex that the old-fashioned "ice box" is 
replaced by an electronic refrigerator. It takes a functionally specialized 
court of the government, with lawyers, to administer legal 
justice-attending to the minute details of voluminous law codes. The 
moralizing polity of China must be amoralized much as the Western 
Church that was constitutionally separated from government can never be 
merged again. The "authority crisis" thesis predicts that when the 
moralizing polity (indicated by a shining star in diagram 1 b) is converted 
into an amoralizing one (i.e. one without a star in diagram 1a) the process 
is unstable. 
However, authority crisis did not materialize in H.K., as predicted, 
dispite that her Chinese population is no less aggressive than elsewhere 
and the fact that her polity was amoralized. The colonial government of 
H.K. is not known to be an inculcator of Confucian (or other) moral values. 
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What is wrong with the "authority crisis thesis" is its "formula" 
✓that equates the fundamental cultural values of China (i.e. the RES) with 
"'aggressionsuppression" (i.e. "denying the legitimacy of sentiments of 
, :aggression")~ While crime and punishment is a part of Confucianism, it is 
only asmall part of it cfz~,.Z ~.*Z..'-'-< ¥'l, t\1/o.tJf<5' \~~~)t, 
~~11-<'.jG, ~ t~i f} ). The following quotation of what the sage has 
said is very illuminous of the other far more important part: 
"Those who loaf around with a full stomach all day long are far 
worse than a busy gambler that, to the extent of his earnest 
dedication, is virtuous." 
<~t~a .i~1~1s.~~~,~if~~ Ji1\~~~~~1-0t) 
If the "prime function" of the government is only "to control aggression", the 
civilization obviously can not be a prosperous one. Thus, what can not be 
explained (i.e. the prosperity) by the celestialism of "Thou shall not be 
aggressive" can be explained by the secularism of "Thou shall gamble 
"aggressively" in "this" world (and how, in H.K.) to suNive and prosper. 
3.4) Com,oetition in the Economic and Political Domain 
That what I have just said is meant to be serious can be sensed from the 
following quotation from the last chapter of the General Theory of Keynes, 
touching on social psychology and distributional justice and aggression: 
"For my own part. I believe that there is social and 
psychological justification for significant inequalities of 
incomes and wealth, (i.e. rational egalitarianism) .... There are 
valuable human activities which require the motive of money­
making and the environment of private wealth-ownership for 
their full fruition. Moreover, dangerous human proclivities (i.e. 
aggression) can be canalized into comparatively harmless 
channels by the existence of opportunities for money-making 
and private wealth, which, if they can not be satisfied in this 
way (i.e. in the economic domain), may find their outlet in 
cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority, 
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and other forms of self-aggrandizement (i.e. in the political 
domain). It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank 
balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is 
a meanssometimes denounced (e.g. by the leftist) as being but 
to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative."39 
(parenthesised expression supplied) 
If orie takes a pessimistic view of human nature to equate competiton 
(e.g. in markets, exams, Majon Parlor, beauty contest, or Olympic Games) 
with "aggression", Keynes argued that the killer's instinct can be 
channeled constructively in the economic domain. The Utilitarian 
"familisms" in H.K. did just that. (see above 3.2) It is entirely reasonable 
to view their earnest competition as a cultural trait and that the Chinese, 
at all time, are "Keynesian" in relishing "income distribution inequality", 
and the fruit of their prosperity induced by "valuable human activities". 
But the same killer's instinct can be channeied in the political domain 
too, "as an alternative", stated somewhat pessimistically and facetiously 
by Keynes. No_one can doubt the fierceness of the competitive Imperial 
Examination System in China ( still evident every summer in Taipei), nor 
the fai~ness of the elite absorption system in H.K. (see 2.2c). The 
rotational selection of the capable and the virtuous to the top of the 
social ladder was a firm part of the political culture of traditional China. 
As long as only a small fraction of the total population are competing 
earnestly, fairly and orderly for "self-aggrandizement" in the nomination 
process, it is not so destructive. The aggressive instincts are channeled 
for the minority of players (i.e. the elites) and satisfactory , emotionally, 
for the majority of the watchers (i.e. the non-elites) of the "games" of 
fair play for which they may become "players" as well in the future. 
The above quotation from Keynes reads on as: 
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"Though in the ideal commonwealth men may have been taught or 
inspired or bred (e.g. as in Imperial China) to take no interest in · 
1he stakes (i.e. income or profit), it may still be wise and prudent 
-statemanship to allow the game to be played, subject to rules and 
· 4imitations(e.g. non-aggressioon by monopolistic parties), so long 
as the average man, or even a significant selection of the 
community, is in fact strongly addicted to the money-making 
passion.1140 ·
(parenthesised expression supplied) 
Wise and prudent politicians must always be less than candid in being 
vocal on popular views and silent on unpopular views for which they have 
deep convictions (e.g. the necessity of a drive to make money as a 
precondition of prosperity and political stability). 
Keynes have, unwittingly, described the moralizing polity of 
traditional China where, inspite of a deprecation of merchantile 
activities (~Y. (~ ) on "doctrinal" ground, the merchants have always 
been left alone to pursue their pecuniary interests in the economic 
domain. Furthermore, during the last 300 years, the merchants have been 
fully "legitimized" by the Confucian Scholars as one of the four 
occup~tional classes (,11-)f\J. ). their hearty merchantile endeavours ()~1-s') 
was viewed quite comparably with the hearty scholarly devotions of the 
gentry class as the two classes are integrated, value-wise, to promote a 
- cause of social interclass mobility long before the arrival of the modern 
epoch.41 · 
4. Stability and Prosperity in an Evolutionary Perspective 
While the traditional Chinese economy was "agrarian", H.K. is a modern 
technological state. To bring these two different economies into the same 
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framework of analysis is based on a hypothesis that cultural values of the 
latter (i.e. H.K.) are the results of an evolutionary adaptation of the 
former. We shall first examine the definition of "economic prosperity" 
for agrarianism in an evolutionaory perspective {4.1) before Chinese 
agrarianism is examined (4.2). This paves the way for a speculation on the 
roles of traditional Chinese cultural values in the evolutionary adaptation 
process on mainland China in the years ahead (4.3), and elsewhere in the 
more remote future (4.4). 
4.1) Economic Prosperity in Agrarian Societies 
In a modern technological society, economic properity is routinely 
_defined in terms of gains in labor productivity (i.e. per capita GNP) or 
material welfare. This special definition emerged gradually in an 
evolutionary process that started with the rapid population expansion 
that accompanied the Industrial Revolution at the beginning of modern 
growth epoch.42 The demographic transition enlightened human race, 
after Malthus, to the effect that our species would not become extinct so 
easily, due to the fact that our production capability will always be more 
than adequate to ensure our survival as a species. 
However, before we gain such self-confidence under agrarianism in the 
historical past, gains in material welfare were subordinated to that of 
the animalistic instinct to survive. It was in this term that "economic 
prosperity" was defined by all thoughtful ancient wisemen. Obviously, no 
cultural value, no matter how superior, has the slightest chance to 
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survive (to say nothing of growth) unless the stomaches were filled (e\it 
·AA._ ). Prof. Hayek, in an article awkwardly entitled "The Rules of 
Morality are not the Conclusion of our Reason", puts forth an evolutionary 
thesis involving morality and stomach in the following words: 
"Our moral heritage (i.e.j_lt¾)in China) becomes an autonomous 
endowment, a treasure distinct from- -and in some· respects even 
superior to- - reason because it allows us to take account of 
effects of our actions which our senses and therefore our individual 
reason could not. In short, it was men's un-understood moral 
traditions, and not their rational knowledge, that enabled them to 
form that extended order of individual interaction (in economic and 
political domains) that enables us today to sustain something like 
200 times the number of human being that existed 5000 years ago. 
I am convinced that this expansion of humankind, and of what 
we call its civilization, was made possible-- at least as much if not 
!TIOre than by the growth of knowledge or intelligence-- by some 
moral beliefs that asserted themselves, not by men increasinly 
understanding their advantages, but simply and solely by the 
selection of those groups which by adhering to them (e.g. RES in 
China) becoming able to build much better than they knew and 
succeed1ng to "be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the world and 
subdue it" as already the book of Genesis (or Confucianism) 
1143describes the destiny of human groups. 
.(parenthesised expression supplied) 
There can not be any serious doubt, after Darwin, that the survival 
instinct that guides activities in the economic as well as the political 
domains, without reasoning, is the strongest instinct at least for the 
gregarious animal species that do not reason about moral rules.
44 Prof. 
Hayek now upholds the same principle for the human species (that, 
unfortunately, does make such attempts) too. 
4.2) Economic Prosperity in Agrarian China 
In traditional China, certainly, the regeneration of population was 
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glorified at both the micro (family} (-!xJJ~f..-.. )as well as the macro 
(society} Qfi~i~.:t..) levels. There is no difference between the wisemen 
of the West and the East that, if anything, were even more pronounced on 
this score on account of their secularism. When economic prosperity is 
equated with the population regeneration capacity, the Chinese, a quarter 
of the mankind, was obviously the most prosperous and "selected" race, in 
the past. 
The paternalistic government, indeed, took good care of both the 
"people" and the "commonwealth" by drilling in the minds of the common 
folks the value of population regeneration which, when faltered, could be 
a cause of great anxiety (!.,<...z~~JJo ,,,(1~J ). In the moralizing polity 
(see 3.3) of traditional China the society, as a whole (i.e. the government· 
and society included), was merely controlled by an "instinct" to survive, 
without reasoning, according to Prof. Hayek. I firmly believe that this is 
the basic reasons for the resilience of traditional Chinese polity, where 
after temporary rebellions, the Chinese always returned to the same 
rotational system because their "instinct" told them the old model has 
been proved to be so effectively "prosperous". 
4.3) Experimentalism on Moral Values 
The Confucian scholars, that always referred to the animal instinct 
derogatively {,i~i_..Ji_ t'J~~~-) would have certainly protested an 
evolutionary view that labels their classics (~.f :P..?f.) as "unreasoned". 
And yet, it was, after all, a Chinese, Lao Tze, that first invented the 
thesis of the "impossibility of reasoning on moral rules"(~q-~yt~~) 
denouncing all cultures a~d sages \~l!~) and glorified the "genes"(i.e. 
i ~ nature) at the same time. Perhaps Confucius also unwittingly 
subscribed to the same thesis when he claimed: 
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I only elaborate, and have faith in, what has proved to be 
effective from ancient time and make no claim in originality 
<1i~~~ i.~~ 1 <r )" 
How modest is this statement when compared with the arrogance of the 
"Party" of mainland China that had made a "full claim" of such an 
originality in their ideological struggle, before 1978 (and in 1987), to 
imprint new values of "socialistic man" by political forces and "reasons". 
The disastrous "ineffectiveness" of that futile experiment 
(1949-i 978) provided a good testimony to the sagacity of the Colonial 
government in H.K. that adopted a laissez faire approach in the economic 
as well as moral (ideological) domains. It was this moral 
non-interference that allowed the traditional cultural values (RES) to 
assert itself ~nd follow a natural course of evolutionary adaptation, 
withou_t reasoning, that has contributed to the Postwar prosperity and 
social political stability in H.K.. 
In the "Decisions by the Central Committee on the Guidelines for the 
Reconstruction of 'spiritual values"' in 1986 (ii:t~?J,-!?~.:t¼J)({f~f.(~ 
~~~~ ~-½~le0;,f:J}x), the Party frankly admits that "serious errors 
were made in the past for too much emphasis on ideological struggle
1145 
while attempting to blueprint, for "Chinese Socialism", a value package 
including elements from the West, Marxism, and traditional China, to fill 
in the current state of "vacuum". The Party autl1ority now finally 
subscribe to the thesis of "impossibility of reasoning" to uphold an 
experimentalism ori moral matters ( ~>:r-1: ~ ~ ~-R~~0;f},*. The 
Party also upholds freedom in "debates", "criticism", "creative writing" 
and "academic researches", which is obviously essential to accommodate 
an experimentalism on moral rules. It is my unconditional prediction that 
one of the components (i.e. fundamental Chinese cultural values- RES), 
proved to be so effective in H.K., Taiwan, and Singapore in the Postwar 
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years, will be "selected" in the not very distant future in spite of the 
attempt to revive "reason" on moral rules in 1987. 
The only assumption is that, aside from the animalistic aggressive 
instinct N!f!J, there is, optimistically, also something innate (j_ ~. 
~1\ ~_t z..~-) in the human "heart" (i.e. inwardly-oriented transcendental 
values.:~~~~ z~~- ~fl.-~'~·) that knows what is good instinctively. 
In addition to this, to the Chinese there is always an asso~iation of 
"heart" with "endeavour" ( JlJtu~ !1..:s~ :g,~. f ,~· ), a truly important 
fundamental Chinese cultural values. 
4.4) Evolutionary Adaptation of Cultural Values 
By the social Darwinism of Prof. Hayek, the moral values of the 
Chinese in H.K. in the past, and/or those on the mainland in the future, 
can not be anything more or less than an evolutionary adaptation of 
traditional cultural value to meet the requirements of a modern 
technological society. There is no need for a moralizing polity as the 
powerful fundamental values would assert themselves inter­
generationally, and, alter only when proved to be no longer effective by
 
experi.ments in the future. 
Many Chinese cultural values highly treasured in the past (e.g. 
monarchy, moralizing polity, preference for population expansion, family
 
clan, the deprecation of the merchant class, one-man virginity of female
s 
cl~1 ), just to mention a few) were abandoned in the evolutionary 
adaptation process. However, these are IlQ1 the fundamental values(see
 
3.1 a). But as long as economic scarcity prevails that makes endeavour 
a 
virtue, as long as human beings have the genes of aggression (i.e. desi
re 
for power, distinction and self aggrandizement), and hence as long as th
e 
benefits (affluence, power and social status) must be somewhat unequa
lly 
allocated, and as long as the rotational justice in a hierarchical class 
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structure (with a polity integrity) is a workable solution, and , most 
importantly, as long as personal integrity (1~~.:A,c•;,:}) matters, there· 
is no immediate threat of extinction of the fundamental traditional 
cultural values-Le. rational egalitarianism and secularism- that will, 
hopefully, be proved condusive to political stability and economic 
prosperity in the 21st century. 
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